We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty E-core. Our main result is...

We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all suffciently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of epsilon for non-emptiness of the...

We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems for arbitrary games with and without sidepayments. The parameters bound (a) the number of approx-imate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size...

We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a) the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this...

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a large game with limited side payments has a nonempty varepsilon core. Our...