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  • Search: subject:"levels of government"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Corruption 2 Decentralization 2 Dezentralisierung 2 Federalism 2 Finanzausgleich 2 Finanzbeziehungen 2 Fiscal relations 2 Föderalismus 2 Intergovernmental transfers 2 Korruption 2 Levels of government 2 Politicians 2 Politiker 2 federalism 2 fiscal relations across levels of government 2 fiscal space 2 gouvernements infra-nationaux 2 governance capabilities 2 institutions 2 intergovernmental relations 2 investissement public 2 levels of government 2 marge de manoeuvre budgétaire 2 public investment 2 public services 2 regional and local development 2 relations budgétaires entre niveaux de gouvernement 2 services publics 2 state/provincial levels of government 2 sub-national government 2 AD type with government activity. Wages and aggregate employment levels are set according to an efficient (Nash) bargaining agreement while the commodity market is cleared in a competitive way. It is shown that, for each level of union power, measured by the share it obtains of the total production surplus, efficient bargaining implies no efficiency loss in production. Depending on the level of union power, temporary equilibria may exhibit voluntary overemployment or underemployment with the competitive equilibrium being a special case. Due to the price feedback from the commodity market and to income-induced demand effects, all temporary equilibria with a positive labor share are not Nash bargaining-efficient with respect to the set of feasible temporary equilibrium allocations. While higher union power induces a larger share of the surplus and a higher real wage, it always implies lower output and employment. Moreover, the induced nominal equilibrium wage is not always a monotonically increasing function of union power. Therefore, all temporary equilibria with efficient bargaining are only Second-best Pareto optimal, i.\,e.\ bargaining power and production efficiency do not lead to temporary optimality. The dynamic evolution of money balances, prices, and wages is analyzed being driven primarily by government budget deficits and expectations by consumers. It is shown that for each fixed level of union power, the features of the dynamics under perfect foresight are structurally identical to those of the same economy under competitive wage and price setting. These are: stationary equilibria with perfect foresight do not exist, except on a set of parameters of measure zero 1 Beschäftigung 1 Dynamisches Modell 1 Environmental Spending 1 Fiscal Federalism 1 Fiscal Stabilization 1 Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft 1 Levels of Government 1 Lohnverhandlungen 1 Makroökonomik 1
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Online availability
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Free 5 Undetermined 4
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 8 Article 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 4 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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Undetermined 5 English 3 Portuguese 2
Author
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Auci, Sabrina 2 Castelli, Annalisa 2 François, Abel 2 Hulbert, Claudia 2 Monteiro Neto, Aristides 2 Méon, Pierre-Guillaume 2 Vammalle, Camila 2 Vignani, Donatella 2 Ahrend, Rudiger 1 Bayoumi, Tamim 1 Böhm, Volker 1 Claas, Oliver 1 Masson, Paul R 1
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Institution
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Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE) 2 C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 1
Published in...
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OECD Regional Development Working Papers 2 CEB working paper / Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim 1 CEPR Discussion Papers 1 EuroEconomica 1 European journal of political economy 1 MPRA Paper 1 Texto para Discussão 1 Texto para discussão / Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 1 Working Papers 1
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Source
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RePEc 5 ECONIS (ZBW) 3 EconStor 2
Showing 1 - 10 of 10
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Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt
François, Abel; Méon, Pierre-Guillaume - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824117
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Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt
François, Abel; Méon, Pierre-Guillaume - In: European journal of political economy 67 (2021), pp. 1-16
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542206
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Federalismo sem pactuação: Governos estaduais na antessala da federação
Monteiro Neto, Aristides - 2014
centralization degree mean that subnational levels of government are prone to have a reduced and limited role in our federalism in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372278
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Efficient wage bargaining in a dynamic macroeconomic model
Böhm, Volker; Claas, Oliver - 2012
This paper analyzes the implications of bilateral bargaining over wages and employment between a producer and a union representing a finite number of identical workers in a monetary macroeconomic model of the AS
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319989
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Local vs. National Environmental Spending: A Stochastic Frontier Analysis
Auci, Sabrina; Castelli, Annalisa; Vignani, Donatella - In: EuroEconomica (2012) 5(31), pp. 43-59
This work studies the impact of public environmental spending in a fiscal federalist framework. The main question is studying when the centralization of this public economic function is welfare improving. Applying the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) on Italian, Portuguese and Slovakian data,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858383
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Local or national environmental spending in Italy: a stochastic frontier analysis
Auci, Sabrina; Castelli, Annalisa; Vignani, Donatella - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
The design of environmental spending at the national or local level stands on the concept of subsidiarity and on the theory of fiscal federalism. The main question is, so forth, studying when centralization of a public economic function, such as the protection of the environment, is welfare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108974
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A Sub-national Perspective on Financing Investment for Growth II - Creating Fiscal Space for Public Investment: The Role of Institutions
Vammalle, Camila; Ahrend, Rudiger; Hulbert, Claudia - Public Governance and Territorial Development … - 2014
relations across levels of government, the nature and characteristics of SNGs’ revenue sources and spending responsibilities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277071
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A Sub-national Perspective on Financing Investment for Growth I - Measuring Fiscal Space for Public Investment: Influences, Evolution and Perspectives
Hulbert, Claudia; Vammalle, Camila - Public Governance and Territorial Development … - 2014
Sub-national governments are key players for public investment, as they are responsible on average for 62% of total public investment in OECD countries. This article analyses the different factors affecting sub-national governments’ fiscal space for public investment. It proposes an indicator...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277075
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Federalismo sem pactuação : governos estaduais na antessala da federação
Monteiro Neto, Aristides - 2014
centralization degree mean that subnational levels of government are prone to have a reduced and limited role in our federalism in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405456
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Liability-Creating Versus Non-Liability-Creating Fiscal Stabilization Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilization and EMU
Bayoumi, Tamim; Masson, Paul R - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
This paper looks at theoretical and empirical issues associated with the operation of fiscal stabilizers within an economy. It argues that such stabilizers operate most effectively at a national, rather than local, level. As differing cycles across regions tend to offset each other for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504538
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