Search Results - subject:"recall strategies"

Should I remember more than you? : best responses to factored strategies

Levínský, René; Neyman, Abraham; Zelený, Miroslav - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 49 (2020) 4, pp. 1105-1124

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591888

Should i remember more than you? On the best response to factor-based strategies

Levínský, René; Neyman, Abraham; Zelený, Miroslav - 2010

In this paper we offer a new approach to modeling strategies of bounded complexity, the so-called factor-based strategies. In our model, the strategy of a player in the multi-stage game does not directly map the set of histories H to the set of her actions. Instead, the player's perception of H...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281616

Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Olszewski, Wojciech - 2008

, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is …), while strict equilibria in unbounded-recall strategies are typically not robust. We prove that the perfect-monitoring folk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266288

Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring

Mailath, George; Olszewski, Wojciech - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2008

private monitoring (the case of almost-public monitoring), while strict equilibria in unbounded-recall strategies are … agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall … strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure towards …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252350

Should I remember more than you? - On the best response to factor-based strategies -

Levínský, René; Neyman, Abraham; Zelený, Miroslav - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

In this paper we offer a new approach to modeling strategies of bounded complexity, the so-called factor-based strategies. In our model, the strategy of a player in the multi-stage game does not directly map the set of histories to the set of her actions. Instead, the player's perception of is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008751287

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version

Mailath, George J.; : Wojciech Olszewski - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150206

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version

Mailath, George J.; Olszewski, Wojciech - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008

We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494290

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Olszewski, Wojciech - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008

private monitoring (the case of "almost-public monitoring"), while strict equilibria in unbounded-recall strategies are … agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall … strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure towards …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126707