Search Results - subject:"repeat offenders"

Gambling bank behaviour, incentive mechanism, and sanctions : a two-stage model

Strecker, Isabel - In: Journal of banking regulation 25 (2024) 2, pp. 197-208

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014583562

Expressive law and escalating penalties : accounting for the educational function of punishment

Miceli, Thomas J. - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 19 (2023) 3, pp. 245-261

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014438878

Knowledge discovery in research on policing strategies : an overview of the past fifty years

Basilio, Marcio Pereira; Pereira, Valdecy; Oliveira, … - In: Journal of modelling in management 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1372-1409

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014334435

Explaining escalating fines and prices : the curse of positive selection

Bühler, Stefan; Eschenbaum, Nicolas - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011912909

Explaining escalating prices and fines : a unified approach

Bühler, Stefan; Eschenbaum, Nicolas - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 171 (2020), pp. 153-164

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012288009

The certainty versus the severity of punishment, repeat offenders, and stigmatization

Mungan, Murat C. - In: Economics letters 150 (2017), pp. 126-129

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764902

Optimal penalties for repeat offenders : the role of offence history

Endres, Alfred; Rundshagen, Bianca - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 16 (2016) 2, pp. 545-578

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507603

Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

Müller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 129 (2015), pp. 116-120

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422056

Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence

Anderson, Lisa R.; DeAngelo, Gregory; Emons, Winand; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Increasing penalty structures for repeat offenses are ubiquitous in penal codes, despite little empirical or theoretical support. Multi-period models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272717

Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

Müller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics Letters 129 (2015) C, pp. 116-120

; i.e., larger fines for a first offense become enforceable. Should overdeterrence of repeat offenders now be reduced? We …When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat … offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263395