Search Results - subject:"revelation"

Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony

Emons, Winand - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2001

higher quality. We show that a court striving for precision prefers truth-revelation to perjury. If the court is rational in … the Bayesian sense, chances for the defendant to prevail are the same under perjury and truth-revelation from an ex ante … point of view. Truth-revelation thus dominates perjury even when the lower quantity of testimony is taken into account. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812729

original papers : Implementation with partial verification

Singh, Nirvikar; Wittman, Donald - In: Review of Economic Design 6 (2001) 1, pp. 63-84

revelation principle to continue to hold with partial verification. We provide economically interesting characterizations of this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178678

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Serio, Virginia Vera de; Chade, Hector - In: Economic Theory 19 (2002) 2, pp. 333-353

We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596674

The Calculus of Stonewalling

Glazer, Amihai; Hassin, Refael - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (2001) 4, pp. 413-424

We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, either by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. If politicians are risk-neutral, then in equilibrium all choose to be evaluated. If politicians are risk-averse, then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777847

Speculative securities

Rahi, Rohit; Marín, José M. - In: Economic Theory 14 (1999) 3, pp. 653-668

A speculative security is an asset whose payoff depends in part on a random shock uncorrelated with economic fundamentals (a sunspot) about which some traders have superior information. In this paper we show that agents may find it desirable to trade such a security in spite of the fact that it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371082

Relying on the Information of Interested Parties

Milgrom, Paul R.; Roberts, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1985

We investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decision maker by providing verifiable information brings out all the relevant information. We find that, if the decision maker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593568

Contract complexity, incentives, and the value of delegation

Melumad, Nahum D. - In: Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS 6 (1997) 2, pp. 257-289

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001335957

Contracting Structures for Custom Software Development: The Impacts of Informational Rents and Uncertainty on Internal Development and Outsourcing

Wang, Eric T. G.; Barron, Terry; Seidmann, Abraham - In: Management Science 43 (1997) 12, pp. 1726-1744

Custom software development projects have special informational attributes that have challenged managers for many years: they are associated with information asymmetries regarding user valuation and developer costs, relationship-specific investments, and a resulting likelihood of positive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009208651

Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

A political constitution is like an incomplete contract: it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem: the appointed policymaker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498040

Asset holdings, information aggregation in secondary markets and credit cycles

Basso, Henrique S.

La agregación de información imperfecta en los mercados secundarios de crédito tiene consecuencias significativas para los ciclos económicos. A medida que los bancos dan más importancia a variaciones en el valor de mercado de sus carteras, concluyen que lo mejor es no revelar al mercado en...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172318