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  • Search: subject:"uncertain deadline"
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Subject
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uncertain deadline 2 Agent-based modeling 1 Agentenbasierte Modellierung 1 Bargaining 1 Börsenkurs 1 Cooperative game 1 Game theory 1 Kooperatives Spiel 1 Share price 1 Spieltheorie 1 Stochastic process 1 Stochastischer Prozess 1 delays 1 endogenous commitment 1 multiagent cooperation 1 pre-opening stock market 1 revision game 1 stochastic process 1
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CC license 1 Free 1 Undetermined 1
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Article 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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English 1 Undetermined 1
Author
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CALABUIG, VICENT 1 CUNYAT, ANTONI 1 Hao, Dong 1 OLCINA, GONZALO 1 Wang, Zhuohan 1
Published in...
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Games 1 International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 2 of 2
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Characterizing agent behavior in revision games with uncertain deadline
Wang, Zhuohan; Hao, Dong - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-13
Revision game is a very recent advance in dynamic game theory and it can be used to analyze the trading in the pre-opening stock market. In such games, players prepare actions that will be implemented at a given deadline, before which they may have opportunities to revise actions. For the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418135
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Cover Image
BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
CALABUIG, VICENT; CUNYAT, ANTONI; OLCINA, GONZALO - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 08 (2006) 04, pp. 525-532
We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047568
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