In this paper, I explore how optimal aggregate dynamics can be shaped by the presence of moral hazard in unemployment insurance. I also analyze the optimal provision of unemployment insurance and the implications for the amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity. The economy that I consider embeds...

We develop an equilibrium search-matching model with risk-neutral agents and two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity Unemployment insurance has the standard effect of reducing employment, but also helps workers to get a suitable job. The predictions of our simple model are consistent with the...

The closed fishing season, known in Brazil as Defeso, is one of the measures of the National Policy for Sustainable Development of Aquaculture and Fishing. However, most normative acts of Defeso are out of date, largely due to a lack of data on fishing, which has become an obstacle to implement...

The closed fishing season, known in Brazil as Defeso, is one of the measures of the National Policy for Sustainable Development of Aquaculture and Fishing. However, most normative acts of Defeso are out of date, largely due to a lack of data on fishing, which has become an obstacle to implement...

Empirical evidence shows that in a labor market characterized by a severe degree of informality, unemployment insurance (UI) has different effects that most of the literature, based on developed countries, address. First, UI takers are incentivized to work in the informal sector while collecting...

I study the effects of fiscal policy responses to aggregate shocks in an economy where households face idiosyncratic unemployment risk in a search and matching (SaM) labor market. By assuming zero liquidity, the households' distribution is degenerate and the model is easily tractable. In the...

Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits have a moral hazard effect and a liquidity effect, withboth generating increases in unemployment spells but the latter increasing wages due to theability to find better matches or better jobs. Previous papers, however, find mixed evidence onthe impact of UI...

The authors study the design of optimal unemployment insurance in an environment with moral hazard and cyclical fluctuations. The optimal unemployment insurance contract balances the insurance motive to provide consumption for the unemployed with the provision of incentives to search for a job....