We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains...

This paper reviews existing characterizations of strategy from military, business and management studies and examines how these characterizations may help inform strategic design processes. The paper serves as an entry point for both design researchers and practitioners interested in...

In the classical bargaining problems, we propose a very mild axiom of individual rationality, which we call Possibility of Utility Gain. This requires that for at least one bargaining problem, there exists at least one player who reaches a higher utility level than the disagreement point. This...

Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by misrepresenting their preferences) are dictatorships....

Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy nonimposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by misrepresenting their preferences) are dictatorships. In...

Purpose This study aims to understand how traveling Instagrammers should be characterized by bridging socio-psychological concepts with Instagram usage and travel typologies. Design/methodology/approach Using analysis of variance, differences between non-Instagrammers and passive and active...