We propose a dynamic model where the real estate market generates wealth segregation within a town. The model develops on the Schelling’s checkerboard dynamics with one main difference: agents are fully characterized by their wealth, which changes with the progress of the model dynamics. The...

This paper introduces flexible endogenous monitoring in dynamic moral hazard. A principal can commit to not only an employment plan but also the monitoring technology to incentivize dynamic effort from an agent. Optimal monitoring follows a Poisson process that produces rare informative signals,...

From the perspective of financial risk–a more macro level, this letter selected three levels of indicators which reflect emerging risks, synthesized seven dimensional indices, and developed a China financial risk index using two different methods, identifying the risk regime by Markov...

How do noncompete agreements between workers and firms affect wages and employment in equilibrium? We build a tractable framework of wage posting with on-the-job search and large employers that provides a natural laboratory to assess anti-competitive practices in the labor market. We...