We investigate learning in a repeated bank choice game, where agents first choose a bank to deposit in and then decide to withdraw that deposit or not. This game has a single Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, characterized by all agents depositing in the bank that offers the highest return,...

We investigate learning in a repeated bank choice game, where agents first choose a bank to deposit in and then decide to withdraw that deposit or not. This game has a single Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, characterized by all agents depositing in the bank that offers the highest return,...

Can bank competition help attenuate the prevalence of zombie firms? Motivated by a stylized model, this paper studies the effect of bank competition on the formation of zombie firms in two stages: the formation of distressed firms and distressed firms obtaining zombie lending. Using China’s...

Can bank competition help attenuate the prevalence of zombie firms? Motivated by a stylized model, this paper studies the effect of bank competition on the formation of zombie firms in two stages: the formation of distressed firms and distressed firms obtaining zombie lending. Using China’s...

Lenders can exploit households' payment data to infer their creditworthiness. When households value privacy, they then face a tradeoff between protecting such privacy and credit conditions. We study how the introduction of an informationally more intrusive digital payment vehicle affects...