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Learning for Employment, Innovating for Growth

Falkinger, Josef; Zweimüller, Josef - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

productivity. Education as well as innovation and production require skilled labour as inputs. This and the fact that learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114510

Procuring Innovation

Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … consider a menu of procurement methods and policies for best procuring new knowledge and innovative products, discussing their … the degree of competition between suppliers, as well as other more practical indirect ways to stimulate innovation. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875

Technology in Growth

Keely, Louise; Quah, Danny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

, emphasizes knowledge as an economic object and, more generally, the economics of intellectual property rights. This paper argues …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497933

Does Education Raise Productivity and Wages Equally ?The Moderating Roles of Age, Gender and Industry

Rycx, Francois; Tojerow, Ilan D.; Saks, Yves - Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Brussels School of … - 2015

The labour market situation of low-educated people is particularly critical in most advanced economies, especially among youngsters and women. Policies aiming to increase their employability either try to foster their productivity and/or to decrease their wage cost. Yet, the evidence on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272744

Marriage and Emancipation in The Age of The Pill

Edlund, Lena Cecilia; Machado, Cecilia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Women’s economic emancipation arguably took off in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While ubiquitous, its origins are not well understood. In an influential paper, Goldin and Katz [2002] pointed to the role of unmarried women’s access to the oral contraceptive (the Pill), ushered in by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008459769

Training and Unions

Booth, Alison L; Chatterji, Monojit - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

The paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time-consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. It is shown that, in the absence of a social planner, the firm has ex-post monopsonistic power that drives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666579

Heterogeneity, Stratification and Growth

Bénabou, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993

-wide linkages (complementary skills, knowledge spillovers). It compares growth and welfare when families are stratified into …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666953

Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence

Acemoglu, Daron; Pischke, Jörn-Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The crucial ingredient in our model is that the current employer has superior information about the worker’s ability relative to other firms. This informational advantage gives the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791865

The Impact of Training on Productivity and Wages: Firm Level Evidence

Konings, Jozef; Vanormelingen, Stijn - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper uses firm level panel data of firm provided training to estimate its impact on productivity and wages. To this end the strategy proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) for estimating production functions to control for the endogeneity of input factors and training is applied....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528543

The Bargaining Family Revisited

Konrad, Kai A.; Lommerud, Kjell Erik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

We suggest a family bargaining model where human capital investment decisions are made non-cooperatively in a first stage, while day-to-day allocation of time is determined later through Nash bargaining, but with non-cooperative behaviour as the fall back. Several authors have claimed that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123898