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How Licensing Resolves Hold-Up: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity

Siebert, Ralph; von Graevenitz, Georg - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper is a study of licensing in a patent thicket. In a patent thicket licensing allows firms to avoid hold-up. It will have different effects on firms' R&D incentives depending on whether firms license existing or future patents. Building on a model of a patent portfolio race, firms'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504462

The Impact of R&D Subsidies on the Introduction of New Products by Incumbent Firms

Siebert, Ralph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper analyses the impact of R&D subsidies on incumbent firms to introduce new goods. We are especially interested in investigating various consequences of government subsidies for R&D, provided to firms that offer products of different qualities. This study examines the incentives of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504784

Venture Capital and Knowledge Transfer

Dessí, Roberta; Yin, Nina - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

communicate valuable knowledge to an entrepreneur, facilitating innovation. The venture capitalist can also communicate the …This paper explores a new role for venture capitalists, as knowledge intermediaries. A venture capital investor can … entrepreneur's innovative knowledge to other portfolio companies. We study the costs and benefits of these two forms of knowledge …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011168896

Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts

Dessí, Roberta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered, benefiting from localized spillovers: Silicon Valley is perhaps the best example. There is also substantial geographical variation in venture capital contracts: California contracts are more 'incomplete'. This paper explores the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084393

Jostling for Advantage: Licensing and Entry into Patent Portfolio Races

Siebert, Ralph; von Graevenitz, Georg - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Licensing in a patent thicket allows firms to either avoid or resolve hold-up. Firms’ R&D incentives depend on whether they license ex ante or ex post. We develop a model of a patent portfolio race, which allows for endogenous R&D efforts, to study firms’ choice between ex ante and ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661516