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Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers
Lim, Jongha - 2013
managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows … times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds … generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459758
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Measuring Institutional Investors’ Skill from Their Investments in Private Equity
Cavagnaro, Daniel R. - 2016
Using a large sample of institutional investors' private equity investments in venture and buyout funds, we estimate the extent to which investors' skill affects returns from private equity investments. We first consider whether investors have differential skill by comparing the distribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456132
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Understanding Corporate Governance Through Learning Models of Managerial Competence
Hermalin, Benjamin E. - 2014
A manager's shareholders, board of directors, and potential future employers are continually assessing his ability. A rich literature has documented that this insight has profound implications for corporate governance because assessment generates incentives (good and bad), introduces assorted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458636
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Learning about CEO Ability and Stock Return Volatility
Pan, Yihui - 2013
When there is uncertainty about a CEO's quality, news about the firm causes rational investors to update their expectation of the firm's profitability for two reasons: Updates occur because of the direct effect of the news, and also because the news can cause an updated assessment of the CEO's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459779
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Why are Buyouts Levered : The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds
Axelson, Ulf - 2007
This paper presents a model of the financial structure of private equity firms. In the model, the general partner of the firm encounters a sequence of deals over time where the exact quality of each deal cannot be credibly communicated to investors. We show that the optimal financing arrangement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465831
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The Success of Acquisitions : Evidence From Disvestitures
Kaplan, Steven - 1990
This paper studies a sample of large acquisitions completed between 1971 arid 1982. By the end of 1989, acquirers have divested almost 44% of the target companies. Using the accounting gain or loss recognized by the acquirer, press reports, and the sale price, we characterize the ex post success...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475543
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Risk-Adjusting the Returns to Private Debt Funds
Erel, Isil; Flanagan, Thomas; Weisbach, Michael S. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
Private debt funds are the fastest growing segment of the private capital market. We evaluate their risk-adjusted returns, applying a cash-flow based method to form a replicating portfolio that mimics their risk profiles. Using both equity and debt benchmarks to measure risk, a typical private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512132
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Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring
Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021
What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458
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Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power : A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's "Pay without Performance
Weisbach, Michael S. - 2006
This essay reviews Bebchuk and Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation". Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465861
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Private Benefits and Cross-Listings in the United States
Benos, Evangelos - 2004
-country differences in the levels of private benefits obtained by corporate managers, as well as the country-specific factors associated … discuss the circumstances under which managers would choose to cross-list their stocks in the United States, when such a cross …-listing has important implications for managers' private benefits. Finally, we survey recent empirical work that tests empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468470