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Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Lim, Jongha - 2013

managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows … times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds … generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459758

Measuring Institutional Investors’ Skill from Their Investments in Private Equity

Cavagnaro, Daniel R. - 2016

Using a large sample of institutional investors' private equity investments in venture and buyout funds, we estimate the extent to which investors' skill affects returns from private equity investments. We first consider whether investors have differential skill by comparing the distribution of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456132

Understanding Corporate Governance Through Learning Models of Managerial Competence

Hermalin, Benjamin E. - 2014

A manager's shareholders, board of directors, and potential future employers are continually assessing his ability. A rich literature has documented that this insight has profound implications for corporate governance because assessment generates incentives (good and bad), introduces assorted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458636

Learning about CEO Ability and Stock Return Volatility

Pan, Yihui - 2013

When there is uncertainty about a CEO's quality, news about the firm causes rational investors to update their expectation of the firm's profitability for two reasons: Updates occur because of the direct effect of the news, and also because the news can cause an updated assessment of the CEO's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459779

Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring

Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458

CEO Centrality

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2007

We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464945

Lucky Directors

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2006

While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465848

Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power : A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's "Pay without Performance

Weisbach, Michael S. - 2006

This essay reviews Bebchuk and Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation". Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465861

Lucky CEOs

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2006

We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465890

Executive Pensions

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2005

Because public firms are not required to disclose the monetary value of pension plans in their executive pay disclosures, financial economists have generally analyzed executive pay using figures that do not include the value of such pension plans. This paper presents evidence that omitting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466764