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Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Lim, Jongha - 2013

managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows … times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds … generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459758

The dark side of outside directors : Do they quit when they are most needed?

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger - 2010

Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462735

Measuring Institutional Investors’ Skill from Their Investments in Private Equity

Cavagnaro, Daniel R. - 2016

Using a large sample of institutional investors' private equity investments in venture and buyout funds, we estimate the extent to which investors' skill affects returns from private equity investments. We first consider whether investors have differential skill by comparing the distribution of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456132

The Demand for Executive Skills

Hansen, Stephen; Ramdas, Tejas; Sadun, Raffaella; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

We use a unique corpus of job descriptions for C-suite positions to document skills requirements in top managerial occupations across a large sample of firms. A novel algorithm maps the text of each executive search into six separate skill clusters reflecting cognitive, interpersonal, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585443

Communication within Firms : Evidence from CEO Turnovers

Impink, Stephen Michael; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

This paper uses novel, firm-level measures derived from communications metadata before and after a CEO transition in 102 firms to study if CEO turnover impacts employees' communication flows. We find that CEO turnover leads to an initial decrease in intra-firm communication, followed by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599332

The Impact of CEOs in the Public Sector : Evidence from the English NHS

Janke, Katharina - 2019

We investigate whether top managers affect the performance of large and complex public sector organizations, using as a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479802

Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?

Fabisik, Kornelia - 2018

Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm's Tobin's q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior literature, our findings are consistent with the literature,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481002

How Do CEOs Make Strategy?

Yang, Mu-Jeung - 2020

We explore the critical question of how executives make strategic decisions. Utilizing a new survey of 262 CEO alumni of Harvard Business School, we gather evidence on four aspects of each executive's business strategy: its overall structure, its formalization, its development, and its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482172

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326