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Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Lim, Jongha - 2013

managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows … times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds … generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459758

The dark side of outside directors : Do they quit when they are most needed?

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger - 2010

Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462735

Measuring Institutional Investors’ Skill from Their Investments in Private Equity

Cavagnaro, Daniel R. - 2016

Using a large sample of institutional investors' private equity investments in venture and buyout funds, we estimate the extent to which investors' skill affects returns from private equity investments. We first consider whether investors have differential skill by comparing the distribution of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456132

Understanding Corporate Governance Through Learning Models of Managerial Competence

Hermalin, Benjamin E. - 2014

A manager's shareholders, board of directors, and potential future employers are continually assessing his ability. A rich literature has documented that this insight has profound implications for corporate governance because assessment generates incentives (good and bad), introduces assorted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458636

Learning about CEO Ability and Stock Return Volatility

Pan, Yihui - 2013

When there is uncertainty about a CEO's quality, news about the firm causes rational investors to update their expectation of the firm's profitability for two reasons: Updates occur because of the direct effect of the news, and also because the news can cause an updated assessment of the CEO's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459779

The Demand for Executive Skills

Hansen, Stephen; Ramdas, Tejas; Sadun, Raffaella; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

We use a unique corpus of job descriptions for C-suite positions to document skills requirements in top managerial occupations across a large sample of firms. A novel algorithm maps the text of each executive search into six separate skill clusters reflecting cognitive, interpersonal, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585443

Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring

Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458

Communication within Firms : Evidence from CEO Turnovers

Impink, Stephen Michael; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

This paper uses novel, firm-level measures derived from communications metadata before and after a CEO transition in 102 firms to study if CEO turnover impacts employees' communication flows. We find that CEO turnover leads to an initial decrease in intra-firm communication, followed by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599332

The Impact of CEOs in the Public Sector : Evidence from the English NHS

Janke, Katharina - 2019

We investigate whether top managers affect the performance of large and complex public sector organizations, using as a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479802

Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?

Fabisik, Kornelia - 2018

Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm's Tobin's q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior literature, our findings are consistent with the literature,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481002