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The dark side of outside directors : Do they quit when they are most needed?

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger - 2010

Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462735

Empire-Builders and Shirkers : Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives

Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999

shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they …, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. In order … to identify whether managers have private benefits or costs, we estimate the joint relationships between incentives and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471449

Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility

Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450

The Demand for Executive Skills

Hansen, Stephen; Ramdas, Tejas; Sadun, Raffaella; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

We use a unique corpus of job descriptions for C-suite positions to document skills requirements in top managerial occupations across a large sample of firms. A novel algorithm maps the text of each executive search into six separate skill clusters reflecting cognitive, interpersonal, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585443

Communication within Firms : Evidence from CEO Turnovers

Impink, Stephen Michael; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

This paper uses novel, firm-level measures derived from communications metadata before and after a CEO transition in 102 firms to study if CEO turnover impacts employees' communication flows. We find that CEO turnover leads to an initial decrease in intra-firm communication, followed by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599332

The Impact of CEOs in the Public Sector : Evidence from the English NHS

Janke, Katharina - 2019

We investigate whether top managers affect the performance of large and complex public sector organizations, using as a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479802

Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?

Fabisik, Kornelia - 2018

Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm's Tobin's q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior literature, our findings are consistent with the literature,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481002

How Do CEOs Make Strategy?

Yang, Mu-Jeung - 2020

We explore the critical question of how executives make strategic decisions. Utilizing a new survey of 262 CEO alumni of Harvard Business School, we gather evidence on four aspects of each executive's business strategy: its overall structure, its formalization, its development, and its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482172

Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger - 2009

We investigate whether bank performance during the credit crisis of 2008 is related to CEO incentives and share ownership before the crisis and whether CEOs reduced their equity stakes in their banks in anticipation of the crisis. There is no evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463437

The Other Side of the Tradeoff : The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation

Aggarwal, Rajesh - 1998

The principal-agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance, yet the existing empirical evidence supporting it is quite weak. The key predication of the model is that the executive's pay-performance sensitivity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472176