We introduce dynamic incentive contracts into a model of unemployment dynamics and present three results. First, wage cyclicality from incentives does not dampen unemployment dynamics: the response of unemployment to shocks is first-order equivalent in an economy with flexible incentive pay and...

"This paper reviews the literature on employment and labor law. It is observed that all jurisdictions in the world have extensive employment and labor law, even though many economists recommend a reduction in legal restrictions. The review of the law illustrates that it has evolved in response...

We document that value-to-price, the ratio of Residual-Income-Model-based valuation to market price, subsumes the power of book-to-market ratio and many other value or quality measures in predicting stock returns. Long-short value-to-price portfolios hedge against momentum, revitalize the...

We study the relation between inflation and real activity over the business cycle. We employ a Trend-Cycle VAR model to control for low-frequency movements in inflation, unemployment, and growth that are pervasive in the post-WWII period. We show that cyclical fluctuations of inflation are...

We study sources and implications of undiversified portfolios in a production-based asset pricing model with financial frictions. Households take concentrated positions in a single firm exposed to idiosyncratic shocks because managerial effort requires equity stakes, and because investors gain...

Most governments are mandated to maintain their economies at full employment. We propose that the best marker of full employment is the efficient unemployment rate, u*. We define u* as the unemployment rate that minimizes the nonproductive use of labor--both jobseeking and recruiting. The...

This study documents how job seekers update perceived job-finding prospects by unemployment duration and by learning about aggregate unemployment. We find that job seekers perceive an 18% decline in their job-finding probability for each additional month of unemployment, but perceive a higher...

Principal-agent models take outside options, determining participation and incentive constraints, as given. We construct a general equilibrium model where workers' reservation wages and the maximum punishment acceptable before workers quit are instead determined endogenously. We simultaneously...