In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.

An inter-governmental body is encouraging the replacement of currency with the objective of discouraging illegal economic activities. This policy is analyzed in a search-theoretic monetary economy with government enforcement. Individuals choose a legal or illegal production and settle trades via...

This paper generalizes the results of Suijs, De Waegenaere and Borm (1998) to arbitrary risks. It provides Pareto optimal allocations and shows that the zero utility premium calculation principle yields a core-allocation.

This paper analyzes linear production situations with price uncertainty, and shows that the corresponding stochastic linear production games are totally balanced. It also shows that investment funds, where investors pool their individual capital for joint investments in financial assets, fit...

The class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)). For assignment games and component additive games there exist polynomially bounded algorithms or order p4 for...

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It...