This paper studies equilibrium search and learning in a dynamic shing gamethat is played by independent shermen and by members of an information sharingCooperative. Once collected, information about the location of productive sh-ing sites is an excludable public good. We show that independent...

We analyze non-cooperative environmental policy when the only strategic interac-tion between countries is through bilateral transboundary pollution, i.e., countries areclosed or small open economies. When countries set pollution taxes simultaneously,there is no carbon leakage. However, in the...

Ordinarily, the process of decision making by a committee through voting is mod-elled by a monotonic game the range of whose characteristic function is restricted tof0; 1g: The decision rule that governs the collective action of a voting body induces ahierarchy in the set of players in terms of...

The core is reformulated to incorporate the externality typical in strategic formgames. Any coalition of players may deviate by trying to commit to a profile of actionsdifferent from a status quo. The outsiders of the coalition may take a coordinatedmeasure, incentive-feasibly for themselves, to...

I exploit a major structural change that has occurred in world soccer to study the impact ofincentives on outcomes in a strategic setting. A game-theoretic model is developed thatcaptures some essential strategic elements of soccer vis-à-vis the number of points awardedto a win. The observable...