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An inter-governmental body is encouraging the replacement of currency with the objective of discouraging illegal economic activities. This policy is analyzed in a search-theoretic monetary economy with government enforcement. Individuals choose a legal or illegal production and settle trades via...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835363
Economic Theory 71 (1996), 44-74. This cost topology might represent geographical, social, or individual differences. It …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775370
This paper generalizes the results of Suijs, De Waegenaere and Borm (1998) to arbitrary risks. It provides Pareto optimal allocations and shows that the zero utility premium calculation principle yields a core-allocation.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775386
This paper analyzes linear production situations with price uncertainty, and shows that the corresponding stochastic linear production games are totally balanced. It also shows that investment funds, where investors pool their individual capital for joint investments in financial assets, fit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775393
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Pareto dominating equilibrium, if uncertainty is large. From the theory of real options it is known that it is optimal to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775424
The class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)). For assignment games and component additive games there exist polynomially bounded algorithms or order p4 for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775427
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775434
The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775442
I apply three noncooperative models of coalition formation to a Cournot olygopoly. In each model, each firm has to choose the coalition it wants to belong to. But each of those models is characterised by a different assumption that defines what happens to a coalition from which one or more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779610