Recent work has shown that, in the presence of moral hazard, balanced budget Nash equilibria in groups are not pareto-optimal. This work shows that when agents misperceive the effects of their actions on the joint outcome, there exist a set of sharing rules which balance the budget and lead to a...

We analyze an infinite stage, alternating offer bargaining game in which the buyer knows the gains from trade but the seller does not. Under weak assumptions the game has a unique candidate Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, and it can be solved by backward induction. Equilibrium involves the...

This paper examines experiments on interdependent security prisoner's dilemma games with repeated play. By utilizing a Bayesian hierarchical model, we examine how subjects make investment decisions as a function of their previous experience and their treatment condition. Our main findings are...

We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute...

The paper develops a general framework for the formulation of generic uniform laws of large numbers. In particular, we introduce a basic generic uniform law of large numbers that contains recent uniform laws of large numbers by Andrews [2] and Hoadley [7J as special cases. We also develop a...

This paper provides an algorithm for computing Markov Perfect Nash Equilibria (Maskin and Tirole, 1988a and b) for dynamic models that allow for heterogeneity among firms and idiosyncratic (or firm specific) sources of uncertainty. It has two purposes. To illustrate the ability of such models to...

This paper exposits and relates two distinct approaches to bounding the average treatment effect. One approach, based on instrumental variables, is due to Manski (1990, 1994), who derives tight bounds on the average treatment effect under a mean independence form of the instrumental variables...

We consider the implications of a specific alternative to the classical measurement error model, in which the data are optimal predictions based on some information set. One motivation for this model is that if respondents are aware of their ignorance they may interpret the question what is the...