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such doping within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major effects are identified which determine …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785818
assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785932
between the agents and thus creates a distortion of efficiency in the coalition. We employ a simple tournament setting where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789604
differences in betting odds or rankings to measure ability differences, our results support standard tournament theory as we find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490450
abilities. This, in turn, has adverse consequences for who might want to participate in a tournament. Since better contestants … anticipate that they will be sabotaged more strongly, it may happen that the most able stay out and the tournament selects one of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739667
A parsimonious model is used to explore the risk-bearing decision under a payoff structure that emphasizes relative performance. Equilibrium betting amounts are derived for players who start with unequal endowments and face a lottery that offers either a positive or negative expected return. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008574272
Considering several main types of dynamic contests (the race, the tug-of-war, elimination contests and iterated incumbency fights) we identify a common pattern: the discouragement effect. This effect explains why the sum of rent-seeking efforts often falls considerably short of the prize that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096152
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-all tournament with a single …-take-all tournament. The proportional-prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113211
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal … scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best … performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140989
We analyze whether incentives from relative performance pay are reduced or enhanced if a department is possibly terminated due to a crisis. Our benchmark model shows that incentives decrease in a severe crisis, but are boosted given a minor crisis since efforts are strategic complements in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140994