In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium...

Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) can be detected by...

We review how realistic frictions in information and/or rationality arrest general equilibrium (GE) feedbacks. In one specification, we maintain rational expectations but remove common knowledge of aggregate shocks. In another, we replace rational expectations with Level-k Thinking or a smooth...

Does bounded rationality make paternalism more attractive? This Essay argues that errors will be larger when suppliers have stronger incentives or lower costs of persuasion and when consumers have weaker incentives to learn the truth. These comparative statics suggest that bounded rationality...

We assume that the instantaneous riskless rate reverts towards a central tendency which in turn, is changing stochastically over time. As a result, current short-term rates are not" sufficient to predict future short-term rates movements, as would be the case if the central" tendency was...