In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium...

Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) can be detected by...

In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...

An investor faced with a contingent claim may eliminate risk by (super-)hedging in a financial market. As this is often quite expensive, we study partial hedges, which require less capital and reduce the risk. In a previous paper we determined quantile hedges which succeed with maximal...

Newspapers and weekly magazines catering to the investing crowd often rank funds according to the returns generated in the past. Aside from satisfying sheer curiosity, these numbers are probably also the basis on which investors pick a fund to invest in. In this article, we fully characterize...