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van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995

This paper surveys some recent developments in (non-cooperative) game theory and provides an outlook on the near future … of that theory. In particular, attention is focused on the limitations inherent in normative game theory and on attempts … to construct a behavioral version of the theory that incorporates aspects of procedural and bounded rationality. It is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092171

Non-cooperative games

van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2014

noted. Conventional theory focuses on the<br/>question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at …) and relaxations (rationalizability and correlated equilibria).<br/>Motivated by experiments that show systematic theory … violations, behavioral game<br/>theory aims to integrate insights from psychology to get better answers to the<br/>question ‘how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011144456

Endogenous price leadership

van Damme, Eric; Hurkens, J.P.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092577

Oskar Morgenstern

van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092622

Equilibrium selection in team games

van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995

It is shown that in team games, i.e. in games in which all players have the same payoff function, the risk-dominant equilibrium may differ from the Pareto dominant one.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090545

On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise

van Damme, Eric; Güth, W.; Ritzberger, K. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size.Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus - as in the Nash demand game with noise - or remain silent and wait until the surplus was publicly observed.Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090638

The European UMTS-auction

van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

In this paper we review, and draw some lessons from, the UMTS-auctions that have taken place in Europe during 2000 and 2001.We address several design issues and, in particular, focus attention on asymmetries between the bidders and on possibilities for collusion.An outlook is provided to several...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091205

Moral hazard and private monitoring

van Damme, Eric; Bhaskar, V. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091285

Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership

van Damme, Eric; Hurkens, J.P.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1996

We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so.To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2.We show that committing is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092317

Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

van Damme, Eric; Weibull, J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092470