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Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This … evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in … design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999

Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472

Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics : the indirect evolutionary approach

Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland - 1999

that are well known from game theory and evolutionary game theory to solve these games. For illustration we include two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580475

Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

sequencing structure of game types, game rules do matter, and directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102

Auctions and fair division games under different price rules : individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582405

Trust and reciprocity in the investment game with indirect reward

Güth, Werner; Königstein, Manfred; Marchand, Nadège; … - 2000

Experimental studies have shown that trust and reciprocity are effective in increasing efficiency when complete contracting is infeasible. One example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this game the person who receives the investment is the one who may reward the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612013

A note on stochastic volatility, GARCH models, and hyperbolic distributions

Jaschke, Stefan R. - 1997

We establish a relation between stochastic volatility models and the class of generalized hyperbolic distributions. These distributions have been found to fit exceptionally well to the empirical distribution of stock returns. We review the background of hyperbolic distributions and prove...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009577459

Higher order forward rate agreements and the smoothness of the term structure

Jaschke, Stefan R. - 1998

This paper proposes linear higher order conditions on the term structure that allow to compute valuation bounds for any deterministic cash stream. Starting from bounds on the forward rate curve and its derivatives, which are nonlinear in the discount factors, we derive linear conditions that are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009579185

Coherent risk measures, valuation bounds, and (my,p)-portfolio optimization

Jaschke, Stefan R.; Küchler, Uwe - 1999

This paper presents a general theory that works out the relation between coherent risk measures, valuation bounds, and … theory presented seems to fill a gap between arbitrage valuation on the one hand and single agent utility maximization or … full-fledged equilibrium theory on the other hand. "Coherent" valuation bounds strike a balance in that the bounds can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581108

Quantile-VaR is the wrong measure to quantify market risk for regulatory purposes

Jaschke, Stefan R. - 2001

Starting from the objective of banking supervision - to minimize the overall costs of banking to the general public - we show that the current standard of quantifying market risk is flawed. It is perfectly aligned with the interests of banks' shareholders and management, but not with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614286