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Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

sequencing structure of game types, game rules do matter, and directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102

Auctions and fair division games under different price rules : individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582405

A note on stochastic volatility, GARCH models, and hyperbolic distributions

Jaschke, Stefan R. - 1997

We establish a relation between stochastic volatility models and the class of generalized hyperbolic distributions. These distributions have been found to fit exceptionally well to the empirical distribution of stock returns. We review the background of hyperbolic distributions and prove...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009577459

Higher order forward rate agreements and the smoothness of the term structure

Jaschke, Stefan R. - 1998

This paper proposes linear higher order conditions on the term structure that allow to compute valuation bounds for any deterministic cash stream. Starting from bounds on the forward rate curve and its derivatives, which are nonlinear in the discount factors, we derive linear conditions that are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009579185

A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games : an experimental study

Decker, Torsten; Stiehler, Andreas; Strobel, Martin - 2002

In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627290

E-privacy : evaluating a new search cost in online environments

Annacker, Dirk; Spiekermann, Sarah; Strobel, Martin - 2001

Electronic Commerce environments increasingly witness a conflict on the subject of e-privacy: While marketers want to maximize their customer knowledge and grasp the identity of their online users, consumers often want to stay anonymous and not reveal private information. The conflict suggests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009615417

The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - 1999

In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581106

Coherent risk measures, valuation bounds, and (my,p)-portfolio optimization

Jaschke, Stefan R.; Küchler, Uwe - 1999

This paper presents a general theory that works out the relation between coherent risk measures, valuation bounds, and … theory presented seems to fill a gap between arbitrage valuation on the one hand and single agent utility maximization or … full-fledged equilibrium theory on the other hand. "Coherent" valuation bounds strike a balance in that the bounds can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581108

An experimental comparison of the fairness models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - 2000

In this note we present an experiment to compare the two competing fairness theories by Bolton / Ockenfels and Fehr / Schmidt. For most experiments that these theories have previously been applied to, they make similar predictions so that it is difficult to compare their predictive accuracy. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583893

Quantile-VaR is the wrong measure to quantify market risk for regulatory purposes

Jaschke, Stefan R. - 2001

Starting from the objective of banking supervision - to minimize the overall costs of banking to the general public - we show that the current standard of quantifying market risk is flawed. It is perfectly aligned with the interests of banks' shareholders and management, but not with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614286