This paper analyzes tax competition between countries which differ in their country-specific risk. We show that the outcome of asymmetric tax competition crucially depends on the ability of multinational firms to shift profits. With high costs of profit shifting, higher-risk countries set lower...

We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in...

Despite the continuing political interest in the usefulness of tax competition and tax coordination as well as the wealth of theoretical analyses, it still remains open whether or when tax competition is harmful. Moreover, the influence of tax differentials on multinationals' decisions is still...

In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing "relocation" mobility of firms leads to increasing "net" tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition, it weakens...

How did the rise of multinational enterprises (MNEs) put pressure on the prevailing international corporate tax framework? MNEs, and firms with market power, are not new phenomena, nor is the corporate income tax, which dates to the early 20th century. This prompts the question, what is...