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Operating performance around the adoption of director incentive plans

Vafeas, Nikos - In: Economics letters 68 (2000) 2, pp. 185-190

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001485069

How risky should an R&D program be?

Tishler, Asher - In: Economics letters 99 (2008) 2, pp. 268-271

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003723734

Addendum to Eleftheriou and Michelacakis (2016)

Eleftheriou, Konstantinos; Michelacakis, Nickolas J.; … - In: Economics letters 148 (2016), pp. 53-54

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619812

Observability and incentive in organizations

Li, Sanxi; Ye, Bing; Yu, Jianyu - In: Economics letters 114 (2012) 2, pp. 205-207

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009547271

Contracting in the Absence of Specific Investments and Moral Hazard : Understanding Carrier-Driver Relations in U.S. Trucking

Lafontaine, Francine; Masten, Scott E. - 2021

provision of marginal incentives, and applies the theory to explain variation in the form of compensation of over-the-road truck … of hauls in a way that is consistent with the theory. By contrast, we find that vehicle ownership, which defines a driver …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212570

The Tenuous Tradeoff between Risk and Incentives

Prendergast, Canice - 2021

Empirical work testing for a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives, a cornerstone of agency theory, has not had …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013228971

Risk and the CEO Market : Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOS?

Edmans, Alex - 2010

This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and heterogeneous moral hazard. Each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed-form equation. In assignment models without moral hazard, allocation depends only on firm size...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143463

The Other Side of the Tradeoff : the Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation

Aggarwal, Rajesh K.; Samwick, Andrew A. - 2021

The principal-agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215701

Income inequality in the trust game

Smith, Alexander - In: Economics letters 111 (2011) 1, pp. 54-56

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009241351

Simultaneous versus sequential information processing

Hoffman, Ross M.; Kagel, John H.; Levin, Dan - In: Economics letters 112 (2011) 1, pp. 16-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009242182

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