managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

respect to takeovers, states have incentives to produce rules that excessively protect incumbent managers. The development of … state takeover law, we argue, is consistent with our theory. States have adopted antitakeover statutes that have little … policy basis, and, more importantly, they have provided managers with a wider and more open-ended latitude to engage in …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

(the market knows less about such investments than the firm's managers) and short-term managerial objectives (the managers … imperfect information and short-term managerial objectives induce managers to underinvest in long-run projects. We show that …