Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 863
Cover Image
Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo - 2000
contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566
Cover Image
Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments
Cağlayan, Deren; Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim; … - 2020
We propose a novel tournament design that incorporates the main properties of a round-robin tournament, a Swiss … tournament, and a race. Following an equilibrium analysis, we compare 36 tournament structures inherent in our model and several … well-known tournament models from the literature, on the basis of expected total equilibrium effort. We show that two of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012387628
Cover Image
Management incentives under formula apportionment : tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting
Martini, Jan T.; Niemann, Rainer; Simons, Dirk - 2014
compensation to managers in low-tax jurisdictions, if payroll enters the FA formula. Managers in high-tax jurisdictions face the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383849
Cover Image
Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation
Banal-Estañol, Albert; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - 2003
We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507904
Cover Image
Merger without cost advantages
Huck, Steffen (contributor); Konrad, Kai A. (contributor);  … - 2005
The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many strategic aspects matter for firm competition such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002757958
Cover Image
Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
Gersbach, Hans - 2001
When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764
Cover Image
Reelection threshold contracts in politics
Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440
Cover Image
Alternative objectives in an oligopoly model : an aggregative game approach
Cornes, Richard; Itaya, Jun-ichi - 2016
power. Examples include the labor-managed firm, mixed oligopoly, and delegation models. These models typically retain the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011565597
Cover Image
On the effects of mergers on equilibrium outcomes in a common property renewable asset oligopoly
Benchekroun, Hassan; Gaudet, Gérard - 2014
This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010434092
Cover Image
Strict incentives and strategic uncertainty
Carlsson, Hans; Wichardt, Philipp C. - 2019 - This Version: June 10, 2019
This paper proposes a comprehensive perspective on the question of self-enforcing solutions for normal form games. While this question has been widely discussed in the literature, the focus is usually either on strict incentives for players to stay within the proposed solution or on strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029170