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We investigate the risk choices of risk averse CEOs. Following recent theoretical work, we expect CEO risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage, or high default probability. We find that the CEOs of these firms reduce firm risk, even in the presence of strong risk taking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013114493
. Vega does not capture risk-taking incentives from managers' stock and debt holdings and does not reflect the fact that … measure explains risk choices better than vega and the relative measures, and should be useful for future research on managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975114
We present a general-equilibrium theory of contracting in which managers are concerned about their social standing in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975405
This paper examines how operational uncertainty affects managerial incentives in information production using the staggered recognition of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by state courts as a quasi-natural experiment. The adoption of IDD improves the protection of trade secrets by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012980105
2008 financial crisis. Strong and weak banks also stand apart: managers from weak banks took more risk than their peers in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013002983
This study provides evidence that managerial incentives, shaped by compensation contracts, help to explain the empirical relationship between uncertainty and investment. We develop a model in which the manager, compensated with an equity-based contract, makes investment decisions for a firm that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006231
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between corporate risk and the interaction between CEO incentive compensation and CEO overconfidence.Design/methodology/approach – This empirical study performs random and fixed effects regression analysis. It uses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251577
The three essays collected in this PhD dissertation concern agency costs, incentive contracts, mergers and acquisitions, and firm risk. The first essay demonstrates that manager sentiment, a managerial trait proxy for managerial optimism, can incur agency costs. The second and third essays state...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254569
provide to their managers. A central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry, which implies that … both firm-level profits and managers' compensation. Consequently, managers' incentives are positively correlated with firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035986
Integrated ownership is often seen as a way to foster specific investments. However, even in integrated firms, managers …, integration calls for low-powered incentive contracts: the managers invest more as they are less exposed to the investment … personally costly to the managers (rather than a monetary investment). The qualitative takeaway remains, however, that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014116587