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Interdependency in Performance

Waddell, Glen; Haraguchi, Kelii H. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

We empirically model performance in the final round of a multiple-round tournament as a spatially autoregressive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763500

Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763542

Doping and Cheating in Contest-Like Situations

Kräkel, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

such doping or cheating within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major effects are identified …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763847

Tournaments and Multiple Productive Inputs: The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs

Konrad, Kai A. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

in a tournament, but increase individual and total output. If the tournament is optimally designed, welfare is higher if …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822353

Prize and Risk-Taking Strategy in Tournaments: Evidence from Professional Poker Players

Lee, Jungmin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

This study examines whether people optimally respond to prize incentives for risk taking in tournaments. I exploit the television game show World Poker Tour as a natural experiment. The results show that professional players strategically choose the degree of risk taking depending on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822382

Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822892

Strategic Mismatches in Competing Teams

Kräkel, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 1999

This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703300

Male and Female Competitive Behavior: Experimental Evidence

Gupta, Nabanita Datta; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

tournament and a piece-rate pay scheme before performing a real task. Men choose the tournament significantly more often than …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703512

Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment

Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter Hans; Schirm, John - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

the tournament even further since output tends to become more slipshod. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703722

Performance Pay and Multi-dimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences and Gender

Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is either a piece rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We elicit … findings are as follows. First, output is much higher in the variable pay schemes (piece rate, tournament, and revenue sharing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703774