This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We...

We consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and can collude.

Laboratory and field studies of time preference find that discount rates are much greater in the short-run than in the long-run. Hyperbolic discount functions capture this property. This paper solves the decision problem of a hyperbolic consumer who faces stochastic income and a borrowing...

We suppose the principal not only designs a mechanism, but can participate as a plyer. The result is a Bayesian model where one player, the pricipal has no information, and the remaining players have complete information.

This essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.