In a real-time electric power auction, the bids of producers consist of committed supply as a function of price. The bids are submitted under uncertainty, before the demand by the Independent System Operator has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer chooses the...

Consider a market where producers submit supply functions to a procurement auction — e.g. an electric power auction — under uncertainty, before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every firm commits to the supply function maximizing his expected profit given...

This paper derives a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) of a pay-as-bid auction, also called discriminatory auction. Such an auction is used in the balancing market for electric power in Britain. For some probability distributions of demand a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. If demand...

Producers submit committed supply functions to a procurement auction, e.g. an electricity auction, before the uncertain demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium(SFE), every firm chooses the bid maximizing his expected profit given the bids of the competitors. In case of...

Most balaning markets of electric power are organized as uniform-price auctions. In 2001, the balancing market of England and Wales switched to a pay-as-bid auction with the intention of reducing wholesale electricity prices. Numerical simultations of an electricity auction model have indicated...

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We...

This essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.