This paper examines sets of Nash equilibrium in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In partial common interest games they contain only informative equilibria.

We consider zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility and propose a simple non-cooperative game to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared. First, the players bid for the right to propose a sharing of the surplus. Second, after the winner pays the bids, she...

A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be...

The main result of the paper is that policy reversals are more likely floowing realization of extreme and relatively unlikely values of parameters that map policy choice into outcomes. A corollary to this result is that policy reversals occur infrequently.