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This paper examines equilibrioum and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2x2 coordination games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639287
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational indivudals are recurrently matched to play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply tthe myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639310
of a system of ordinary differential equations of the type studied in evolutionary game theory. We establish precise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639325