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Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation

Björnerstedt, Jonas; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1994

No abstract.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010611601

Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model

Weibull, Jörgen W.; Saez-Marti, Maria - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1998

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190635

Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies

Hofbauer, Josef; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1995

No abstract.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818312

The 'As if' Approach to Game Theory: 3 Positive Results and 4 Obstacles

Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1993

No abstract.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818361

The Mass-Action Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium

Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1994

No abstract.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818403

An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory

Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1992

No abstract.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685042

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games

Banerjee, Abhijit; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1996

This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2 x 2 coordination games. This set is finite and functionally independent of risk-dominance relations. As the number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010600198