We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue.We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society.We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

This paper shows that some classes of relaxed sequencing games, which arise from the class of sequencing games as introduced in Curiel, Pederzoli, Tijs (1989), are balanced.

In this paper we study cooperative cost games arising from domination problems on graphs.We introduce three games to model the cost allocation problem and we derive a necessary and su cient condition for the balancedness of all three games.Furthermore we study concavity of these games.

In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex...

In this paper we study the relation between convexity of TU games and marginal vectors.We show that if specfic marginal vectors are core elements, then the game is convex.We characterize sets of marginal vectors satisfying this property, and we derive the formula for the minimum number of...

In this paper we construct sets of marginal vectors of a TU game with the property that if the marginal vectors from these sets are core elements, then the game is convex.This approach leads to new upperbounds on the number of marginal vectors needed to characterize convexity.An other result is...