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Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size.Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus - as in the Nash demand game with noise - or remain silent and wait until the surplus was publicly observed.Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090638
rejected by the data.The data are better explained by either equity theory (equal splits) or by a game theoretic model where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090688
We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame.In one treatment, responders' reactions are hidden to proposers.We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders' intrinsic resistance to unfairness.In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092134
This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in apex games under the following assumptions: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092140