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An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent's ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire's type differs from the true underlying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481769
We introduce the model of asset management developed in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) into a Solow-style neoclassical growth model with diminishing returns to capital. Savers rely on trusted intermediaries to manage their wealth (claims on capital stock), who can charge fees above costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459544
We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of "extremists" who will never take the good/trusting action. Good actions may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460403
investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds … by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently … involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460486