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An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent's ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire's type differs from the true underlying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481769
We study the implications of a particular form of irrationality on the pricing behavior of firms in a monopolistic-competitive market with incomplete information. We assume that firms are overconfident, meaning that they over-estimate their abilities to understand the correct model of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466749
We introduce the model of asset management developed in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) into a Solow-style neoclassical growth model with diminishing returns to capital. Savers rely on trusted intermediaries to manage their wealth (claims on capital stock), who can charge fees above costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459544
investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds … by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently … involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460486