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An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent's ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire's type differs from the true underlying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481769
We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment. In our model …. Banks maximize profits, and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors. The theory explains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463705
We introduce the model of asset management developed in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) into a Solow-style neoclassical growth model with diminishing returns to capital. Savers rely on trusted intermediaries to manage their wealth (claims on capital stock), who can charge fees above costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459544
investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds … by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently … involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460486
We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461542