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Deng, Shanglyu - 2020

An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent's ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire's type differs from the true underlying...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481769

Style Investing

Barberis, Nicholas - 2000

We study asset prices in an economy where some investors classify risky assets into different styles and move funds back and forth between these styles depending on their relative performance. Our assumptions imply that news about one style can affect the prices of other apparently unrelated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470692

Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle

Lee, Charles - 1990

individual investor sentiment toward closed end funds and other securities. The theory implies that discounts on various funds …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475562

Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation

De Long, J. Bradford - 1989

Analyses of the role of rational speculators in financial markets usually presume that such investors dampen price fluctuations by trading against liquidity or noise traders. This conclusion does not necessarily hold when noise traders follow positive-feedback investment strategies buy when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476174

Finance and the Preservation of Wealth

Gennaioli, Nicola - 2013

We introduce the model of asset management developed in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) into a Solow-style neoclassical growth model with diminishing returns to capital. Savers rely on trusted intermediaries to manage their wealth (claims on capital stock), who can charge fees above costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459544

Money Doctors

Gennaioli, Nicola - 2012

investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds … by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently … involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460486

A Model of Shadow Banking

Gennaioli, Nicola - 2011

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461542