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Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084279

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946

Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey

Djankov, Simeon; Murrell, Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We survey the empirical literature analysing the process of enterprise restructuring in transition economies. The survey provides new insights into the relative effectiveness of different reform policies, and into how this effectiveness varies across regions. We study the effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504282

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hamdani, Assaf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

should err in favour of the arrangement that is less favourable to managers. Such an approach, we show, would make it most …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656367

EFFICIENCY IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES: DARWIN, NASH AND SECRET HANDSHAKE.

ROBSON, A.J. - Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646647