Power in American and German multi-chamber legislation is determined either by an inter-institutional or an internal coalition problem of all inter-linked chambers. Hence, the complexity of multi-chamber systems relies on different subgames, different types of decision rules and different types...

Although mediation is one of the most widely used conflict management techniques, not all international conflicts involve mediation. Why do mediators intervene in some conflicts while not in others? Do third parties strategically select cases for mediation? How does their decision to intervene...

Institutions structure incentive environments for strategic actors. What is the effect of a flawed institution - one that is not perfectly predictable - on strategic behavior? This paper focuses on the influence of the judiciary on inter-governmental rivalry in a federation, in particular...

A generic Negotiation Game (NG) is used to model a conflict between two parties seeking to resolve their differences and reach a settlement. NG is a 2 × 2 non-constant-sum symmetric game that is `generic' in the sense that its payoffs, which are assumed to be cardinal, are only incompletely...

This paper continues the examination of the validity of game-theoretic explanations in empirical social science and policy research. Assuming that real actors with bounded rationality would be unable to cope with the explosive complexity of n-person games, discussion focuses on the conditions...