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Modeling the commons as a game with vector payoffs

Lejano, Raul P.; Ingram, Helen - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 24 (2012) 1, pp. 66-89

Since Hardin first formulated the tragedy of the commons, researchers have described various ways that commons problems are solved, all based on the model of individual rationality. Invariably, these institutional solutions involve creating some system of property rights. We formulate an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009654090

One man, one vote, one time? A model of democratization in the Middle East

Blaydes, Lisa; Lo, James - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 24 (2012) 1, pp. 110-146

The protests associated with the 2011 Arab Spring represent a serious and sustained challenge to autocratic rule in the Middle East. Under what conditions will Arab protest movements translate into a full-fledged â€˜fourth waveâ€™ of democratization? We argue that questions about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009654096

Is There Really a Turnout Paradox?

Medina, Luis Fernando - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2011) 3, pp. 382-399

This paper challenges the notion that voting games with purely instrumental players cannot account for high turnout (the ‘turnout paradox'). Although it has been known for over 25 years that such games can generate high-turnout equilibria, the said equilibria have been rejected on the grounds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294412

Domestic Reform as a Rationale for Gradualism in International Cooperation

Urpelainen, Johannes - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2011) 3, pp. 400-427

Gradualism is common in international cooperation, as states begin with limited cooperation and choose more ambitious targets slowly over time. However, most models of international cooperation are static and thus cannot explain gradualism. I show that when states can implement domestic reforms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294416

The origins of social institutions

Urpelainen, Johannes - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2011) 2, pp. 215-240

How do individual agents enact the institutions that govern collective behavior in a social situation? How do individuals come to share self-enforcing expectations about collective behavior, so that societal rules and constraints have an effect on individual choice? Conventional accounts, such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367614

Game Theory and Juries

Margolis, Howard - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (2001) 4, pp. 425-435

Recent work on game theory and juries reaches the startling result that making convictions easier (by easing the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777776

Deterrence Theory Discussion: I

McGinnis, Michael D. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1992) 4, pp. 443-457

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777792

Power and Preferences Again

Braham, Matthew; Holler, Manfred J. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 17 (2005) 3, pp. 389-395

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777804

Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity

Scharpf, Fritz W. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 3 (1991) 3, pp. 277-304

This paper continues the examination of the validity of game-theoretic explanations in empirical social science and policy research. Assuming that real actors with bounded rationality would be unable to cope with the explosive complexity of n-person games, discussion focuses on the conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777808

Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited

Zagare, Frank C.; Kolgour, D. Marc - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 10 (1998) 1, pp. 59-87

The theoretical literature of interstate conflict is dominated by two conceptual models, classical deterrence theory … and the spiral model. The fundamental tenet of classical deterrence theory is that credible and capable threats can … prescriptions associated with deterrence theory frequently lead to vicious cycles of reciprocated conflict.According to Jervis `both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777829