We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the typical industry colludes by threatening to punish deviations from an implicitly agreed upon pricing path. We argue that models of this type explain better than do competitive models the way in which the economy responds to aggregate...

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the typical industry colludes by threatening to punish deviations from an implicitly agreed upon pricing path. We argue that models of this type explain better than do competitive models the way in which the economy responds to aggregate...

We derive a new cost of information in rational inattention problems, the neighborhood-based cost functions, starting from the observation that many settings involve exogenous states with a topological structure. These cost functions are uniformly posterior-separable and capture notions of...

We propose a new measure of the cost of information structures in rational inattention problems, the "neighborhood-based" cost functions, given that many applications involve states with a topological structure. These cost functions summarize the results of a sequential information sampling...