Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental games each player was informed about both his payoff and the action of the other player in the...

We consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and can collude.

If an inspector is work averse and his effort spent on investigating reports is not observable this creates a moral hazard problem whenever there is an imperfect monitoring technology. This problem arises because the organization can not distinguish between an inspection that doesn't find...

The model we discuss in this note is a re-examination of the classical Bertrand model of imperfect competition. the main difference is that consumers are allowed to have some strategic behavior when deciding from which one of the two sellers to buy. We will approach the resolution of the...

It is well known that, whereas in one-agent contexts the value of information is always positive, in strategic situations, this is not always the case. We will consider the class of games for which, under a specific information structure, there exists a unique Pareto payoff profile, and we show...

The paper discusses several topics such Nash equilibria, repeated games. It also discusses applications to market games, regulation and R&D games.

We present the model of games with incomplete information first introduced by Harsanyi and show the link with extensive form games with imperfect information. We provide then a construction of the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir together with some properties.

The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.