In many developing and developed countries, government debt stabilization is an important policy issue. This paper models the strategic interaction between the monetary authorities who control monetization and the fiscal authorities who control primary fiscal deficits. Government debt dynamics...

This paper explores how decentralized, national fiscal policies interact with a common monetary policy in a monetary union. We show that fiscal policy plays a more important ro le in stabilizing country-specific shocks than with national monetary policies. Whereas monetary u nification with an...

This paper explores under what conditions a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national...

We show that, with benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership, monetary unification reduces inflation, taxes and public spending. These disciplining effects of a monetary union, which rise with the number of fiscal players in the union, are likely to raise welfare. Joining an optimally...

The recent public debt crisis in most developed economies implies an urgent need for increasing tax revenues or cutting government spending. In this paper we study the importance of household heterogeneity and the progressivity of the labor income tax schedule for the ability of the government...